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Scrutiny of proposed water uses for conformity with the public interest is common practice in the West. All but two of the eighteen continental western states require public interest review of new appropriations.' More than half of these states require review in order to transfer existing appropriations to new uses.' Review occurs under statutes
that require a permit from a state agency to make an appropriation or
transfer and allow the agency to issue a permit only if the proposed
water use will not be detrimental to the public interest.'
Most of these statutes contain no definition of the public interest.
The few statutes that define it do so by listing factors the agency should
weigh and typically include at least one open-ended factor such as

1. ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.080(a) (4) (2006); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-152(A), 153(A) (2005); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1253, 1255 (West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42203A(5) (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-711(a)-(b) (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2311 (3) (b) (2005) (using the phrase "reasonable use" rather than "public interest" but
defining it by listing standard "public interest" criteria); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-234, 235(1), -235(2) (a) (iii), -235(4) (a) (2005); NEv. REv. STAT. § 533.370(5) (2005); N.M.
STAT. §§ 72-5-7, 72-12-3(E) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-04-06(4) (2005); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 537.153(2), .170(8) (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-2A-9 (2005); TEX. WATER
CODEANN. § 11.134(b) (3) (Vernon (2005); UTAH CODEANN. § 73-3-8(4) (2005); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.290(3) (West 2006); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-931 to -932, 41-4503 (2005). Some of these statutes use the phrase "public welfare" instead of "public
interest" or use both phrases interchangeably.
The appropriation doctrine dominates western water law. It governs streams
and lakes in all western states and is the exclusive system for acquiring new water rights
in all but three of them. See GEORGE A. GOuLD ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER

LAw 9 (7th ed. 2005). It also governs groundwater in most western states to the exclusion of any other doctrine. See id. at 10.
The only western states without public interest review of new appropriations are
Colorado, which has no permit system, and Oklahoma, which removed public interest
review from its permit system in 1963. Joseph F. Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream
and Surface Under the 1963 Amendments, 23 OKLA. L. REv. 19, 50 (1970).
2. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11 § 93.930(b) (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-222(1)
(2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-708b(a) (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-402(4) (2005)
(using the phrase "reasonable use" but defining it in terms of usual public interest
criteria); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 46-290, -294(1) (2005); NEv. REv. STAT. § 533.370(5)
(2005); N.M. STAT. §§ 72-12-7(A), 72-12B-1 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 46-2A-12
(2005), TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.122 (Vernon 2005), as implemented by 30 TEx.
ADMIN CODE § 297.46 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (2005); see also Bonham v.
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499-500 (Utah 1989) (interpreting a similarly worded earlier
version of § 73-3-3).
3. ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.040(B), .080(a) (2006); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45152(A), -153(A) (2005); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1252, 1253, 1255 (West 2006); IDAHO
CODEANN. §§ 42-203A(5), 42-222(1) (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-711(a)-(b) (2004);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-311 (3)(b), 85-2-402(4) (2005); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 46-234 to 235, -294(1), -2,116 (2005); NEv. REv. STAT. § 533.370(5) (2005); N.M. STAT. §§ 72-5-7,
72-12-3(E), 72-12-7(A), 72-12B-1 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06(4) (2005); OR.
REV. STAT. § 537.153(2) (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 46-2A-9, -12 (2005); TEX. WATER
CODE ANN. § 11.134(b)(3)(C) (Vernon 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8(4) (2005);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.03.290(3) (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-931 to -932, 41-4503 (2005).
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"harm to other persons"' or "all other matters pertaining to such question."' Consequently, whether a statute defines the public interest or
not, important specifics about the function and scope of public interest
review are left to the permitting agency and reviewing courts.6
Given the obscurity of legislative intent about specifics, public interest review produced remarkably little litigation from its beginnings a
century ago until the mid-1980s. Since then, however, water project
opponents have sought to broaden review in various ways, causing significant controversy and litigation. Some courts have broadened review; others have contained it. In one state, aggressive judicial broadening of review provoked the legislature to mandate striking retrenchment. These divergent modern developments-judicial broadening, judicial containment, and legislative retrenchment-raise questions about the future course of public interest review.
This article examines the future of public interest review by focusing on lessons to be learned from the past. In the earliest days, two
rival models of review emerged from permitting agencies. Several
courts soon embraced one model. The other model later gained judicial approval. For the most part, however, courts have rarely noticed
and commentators have entirely overlooked the existence and inconsistence of the two models. That is unfortunate because an understanding of the rival models illuminates the recent litigation and helps
frame issues affecting the future of public interest review.
Part I of this article explains the two models. Part II describes and
critiques major developments in the history of public interest review
from the perspective of the two models. Part III identifies several key
issues for the future and discusses considerations in resolving them. It
also demonstrates that their resolution requires fundamental policy
judgments upon which existing statutes generally provide no guidance.
The article concludes that state legislatures should revisit their public
interest review statutes and provide direction on the policy issues
rather than leave their resolution to administrative and judicial interpretation of vacuous existing statutes.

4. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080(b) (6) (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06 (2005).
5. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-711 (b) (5) (2004).
6. See United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 341 F.3d 1172, 1181-82 (9th
Cir. 2003) ("By its silence, the legislature h, left the task of defining 'public interest' to
the State Engineer and, ultimately, to the Nevada courts").
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I. THE TWO MODELS OF REVIEW
A. Origins
The requirement of public interest review of water permit applications dates back in most states to the period between 1890 and 1920.'
In those days, the state engineer was typically the permitting official.'
By 1906, when the state engineers of only Utah, Wyoming, and Nevada
had implemented the public interest standard,' the two rival approaches already emerged.
The Utah state engineer interpreted the standard as authorizing
him to choose between possible water uses and deny any permit application that did not propose the best possible use of the water."° The
Wyoming state engineer took a similar view." In contrast, the Nevada
state engineer took the position that he could not deny a permit application as detrimental to the public interest if it proposed a lawful use
of water.'" The Utah and Wyoming approaches are the genesis of what
can be called the maximum-benefits model of review. The Nevada
approach is the origin of what can be called the other-laws model of
review.
B. Attributes
The core idea behind the maximum-benefits model is that the legislature intended the permitting agency to use public interest review of
applications as a tool to maximize the benefits to the community from
the water resource. For the agency to do that, it must ascertain a procosts, not only to the applicant but also to
posed project's benefits and
3
community.'
the
others in
The calculation of community benefits and costs is not simply a
mechanical matter because it depends significantly on state policy. To
illustrate, suppose that permit applications are filed to appropriate
water for a large new industrial plant and a nearby residential community to be built in a sparsely populated agricultural area. Current resi7.

A HISToRIcAL AND FUNcTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE
(1971).
Most of the early water codes also conditioned issuance of a permit upon conCHARLES

J.

MEYERS,

APPROPRIATION SYSTEM 10-15

8.

formity of the proposed project to sound engineering principles. For that reason, it
made sense to put a trained engineer in charge of issuing permits. R.P. TEELE, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE STATE ENGINEER AND HIs RELATION TO IRRIGATION

9.
10.

96 (1906).

Id.
Id.

11.
Id. (reporting that the state engineer's exercise of discretion resulted in
"charges of favoritism" and caused him "a great deal of trouble").
12. Id. at 76. The statute provided the lack of unappropriated water as grounds for

denying a permit. Id.
13. See Frank J. Trelease, Alaska's New Water Use Act, 2
(1967).

LAND

& WATER L. REv. 1, 26
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dents enjoy their pastoral lifestyle and excellent deer hunting. The
proposed development will make the area less pastoral and result in a
larger population of local hunters to compete for deer. Should the
permitting agency consider these unfavorable effects on current residents as costs in its maximization calculus? There would be no reason
for it to count them if state policy is unconcerned with preserving pastoral lifestyle and hunting for fewer rather than more hunters.
The earliest appellate cases embracing the maximization model established that the permitting agency can look to unwritten public policy for guidance about what should count as a community benefit or
cost.' If unwritten public policy can be a guide, it follows that written
public policy found in other state statutes should also qualify, and
courts later sanctioned this practice. 5
The core idea of the other-laws model of review is that the legislature intended the permitting agency merely to apply other state laws,
e.g., the requirement commonly found in western water codes that
water can be appropriated only for a beneficial use.'6 With the permitting agency limited to applying other state laws, unwritten public policy
plays no role under this model. Written public policy as found in
other state water statutes is determinative. 7 Absent a state law calling
for maximization, the agency has no authority to use public interest
review to maximize benefits to the community.'8 The agency's issuance
of a permit might increase community benefits to whatever extent implementation of other state laws happens to produce that result, but
the standard for decision is not maximizing net benefits.
C. Rationales
The maximum-benefits model of review has two rationales, both of
which derive from Young & Norton v. Hinderlider," decided in 1910 by

the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico. The court rejected an administrative commission's decision that review was limited
to whether the proposed project would menace the public health or
safety.' The court said the commission's view of the public interest
standard was too narrow because the water code declared that waters
in the territory were "public waters" and because the code overall was

14.
15.
16.
17.
1996);
2003).
18.
19.
20.

See infra text accompanying note 46.
See, e.g., Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 963 (Utah 1943).
See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-141 (2005); NEv. REV. STAT. § 533.035 (2005).
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Washoe County, 918 P.2d 697, 698-700 (Nev.
United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 341 F.3d 1172, 1183 (9th Cir.
See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
110 P. 1045 (N.M. 1910).
Id. at 1050.
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"designed to secure the greatest possible benefit from them for the
public ...."'
The first rationale deducible from the court's statement is that
since water is a public resource, the legislature must have intended
public interest review of permit applications as a tool to maximize
benefits from the resource to the public. This rationale is widely available in the West. Nearly all western states have long had water codes,
constitutional provisions, or judicial decisions declaring that waters
within state borders belong to the public or to the state for the public.'
The second rationale, based on the overall design of the New Mexico water code, is more complicated. The water code, like those of
other western states, embodied the appropriation doctrine." Key principles of the appropriation doctrine-that water rights depend on diversion and beneficial use rather than ownership of riparian land, that
water can be used on nonriparian land as well as riparian land, and
that water is allocated during shortage by temporal priority rather than
an imprecise concept of reasonable sharing-departed from the eastern riparian doctrine in order to promote economic development in
arid country that would require the consumptive use of water. 4 From
these key principles, the Hinderlidercourt inferred an unstated legislative intent that public interest review should seek to maximize economic development." The court was operating under the maximumbenefits model guided by unwritten public policy that maximum benefits means maximum economic development.
The second rationale for the maximum-benefits model is closely associated with the water ethic of an era that favored using water to
maximize economic development." Now, the prevailing ethic has
changed. It favors managing water to maximize combined economic
and noneconomic benefits.' This change calls the second rationale's
viability into question. Arguably, however, the early western legislatures that required public interest review appreciated that written and
unwritten water policies might evolve and intended review as a tool to
maximize benefits in accordance with evolving public policies.

21.

Id.
See 1 WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES
5 (1971).
23.
See Snow v. Abalos, 140 P. 1044, 1048 (N.M. 1914); Hagerman Irrigation Co.v.
McMurry, 113 P. 823, 824-25 (N.M. 1911); 2 SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WESTERN STATES § 1440 (3d ed. 1911).
24. MEYERS, supra note 7, at 3-4
25. Hinderlider,110 P. at 1049-50.
26. See MEYERS, supra note 7, at 6; George A. Gould, A Westerner Looks at Eastern Water Law: Reconsideration of Prior Appropriation in the East, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv.
89,98 (2002).
27. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 227 (1973).

22.
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Turning to the other-laws model of review, its rationale is more
speculative. The nondelegation doctrine may have been a factor behind its emergence. This doctrine prohibits a legislature from delegating power to an administrative agency unless the legislature provides
adequate standards to guide the agency's discretion and enable meaningful judicial review.' Historically, some state courts applied the doctrine to invalidate undefined public interest tests in statutes authorizing administrative agencies to regulate various activities other than
water use.' Some western courts may have seen the other-laws model
as the only way to uphold an undefined public interest test for issuing
water permits.
Another factor may have been concern that a maximum-benefits
approach under which the state engineer would discern and implement unwritten public policy could bog down in ambiguity and subjectivity. A 1906 study of public interest review concluded that broad discretion in state engineers under the public interest standard "leaves
room for charges of discrimination and appeals to the courts. It seems
to be better to leave to the legislature the determination of what is
good public policy. . ."' A court in agreement with this sentiment
might have concluded that the legislature surely could not have intended to grant authority to the water agency to discern and implement unwritten public policy.
These two factors behind the emergence of the other-laws model
might well have continuing influence. Although a number of modern
courts have relaxed their position on the nondelegation doctrine, not
all of them have." Even if a court now takes a more relaxed approach
to the nondelegation doctrine than it formerly did, it might refuse to
force departure from longstanding administrative adherence to the
other-laws model on the theory that the legislature presumably is aware
of the practice and by its silence, has demonstrated support for it."
Finally, modern times have hardly seen the disappearance of uneasiness about agency subjectivity under an ambiguous public interest
standard."
28.
29.
30.
31.
States,

See 1 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 54 (1965).
See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.13 (3d ed. 1991).
TEELE, supra note 8, at 96.
Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the
8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 568, 578-79 (1994); see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 57-58 (4th ed. 2004) (noting some scholars prefer a
tight nondelegation doctrine on the ground of making administrative regulation democratically legitimate).
32. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Washoe County, 918 P.2d 697, 700-01 (Nev.
1996).
33. See Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard:Is It Too Indeterminate to be Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427, 443-52 (2001) (criticizing the public interest standard in the Communications Act of 1934 as too vague and arguing that Congress
should provide more concrete guidance to the Federal Communications Commission).
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II. THE MAJOR ERAS OF PUBLIC INTEREST REVIEW
The first and longest era in the history of public interest review,
lasting until roughly the mid-1960s, was characterized by the use of
review to maximize economic development. The next era, spanning
roughly twenty years, was notable for the integration of instream flow
values into public interest review. The present era, commencing in the
mid-1980s, is marked by efforts of water project opponents to broaden
public interest review based on claims of unwritten public policy, sometimes with success and sometimes not.
A. The Era of Maximizing Economic Development
The maximum-benefits model of public interest review was wellsuited to the single-minded ethic favoring maximum economic development that generally prevailed in the arid West until the mid-1960s.
Several appellate courts eagerly embraced the model during this era.
The other-laws model was less prominent in the courts. At best, it
likely was the basis for one court's rejection of a nondelegation challenge, although another court reached the same result without relying
on it.
1. The Maximum-Benefits Model
The maximum-benefits model got off to a rocky start despite its
suitability to the prevailing development ethic. Soon after the Utah
Legislature required public interest review in 1903, the state engineer
denied a permit application on the ground that it did not propose the
best possible use of water.' A court promptly overturned the denial,
and in 1905, the legislature repealed the state engineer's authority to
deny permits as detrimental to the public interest.'
By 1906, the
Wyoming state engineer's similar maximization approach to public
interest review provoked "charges of favoritism" and caused "him a
great deal of trouble."'
Undaunted by the criticism and the events in neighboring Utah,
the Wyoming state engineer persisted. In a 1908 ruling that was not
appealed, he conditioned an appropriation for hydroelectric power
generation upon lowering the height of a proposed water storage dam,
which substantially reduced its generating capacity, to prevent the project from interfering with economically more valuable mineral development in the region." He used public interest review to maximize
34.
35.
36.
37.
action

supra note 8, at 68-69.
Id. at 68-69, 96.
Id. at 96.
Big Horn Power Co. v. State, 148 P. 1110, 1112-13 (Wyo. 1915) (reporting this
by the state engineer but not ruling on it because it was not appealed).
TEELE,
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economic benefits not just from the water resource but from all the
state's natural resources.
During the second decade of the twentieth century, reviewing
courts in several jurisdictions sanctioned, indeed required, the use of
public interest review to maximize economic benefits from the water
resource.' Courts at the time had no occasion to consider the Wyoming state engineer's idea of maximizing benefits from all natural resources.
The first and leading case was Young & Norton v. Hinderlider. This
is the New Mexico case noted earlier that provided the two rationales
for the maximum-benefits model. The case concerned conflicting applications to appropriate water from a river for irrigation.' The cost
per acre of supplying water to the larger project would be much more
than for the smaller project.4' The court said the smaller project
should get the permit if the larger one would fail due to economic
infeasibility or insufficient water available in the river." It reasoned
that a failed project would be detrimental to the public interest both
because of harm to the irrigators served by it and because the failure
would tend to destroy confidence in irrigation and deter investment in
other irrigation projects.4 ' But the court also indicated the larger project should get the permit if it, or a scaled-back version of it, would be
economically feasible and would fit the available water supply." The
court wanted to see as many acres as possible irrigated from the available supply.45 In the court's view, this outcome would maximize benefits from the water resource to the public.
The early twentieth century appellate courts using public interest
review to maximize economic development did not cite any state statutes declaring such a policy. Instead, the courts relied on unwritten
public policy favoring maximum economic development that depended on using water in arid country.'
38. In re Commonwealth Power Co., 143 N.W. 937, 938 (Neb. 1913); Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045, 1048 (N.M. 1910); Cookinham v. Lewis, 114 P. 88, 90
(Or. 1911). The Nebraska court also used public interest review to promote economic
development within the state. Kirk v. State Bd. of Irrigation, 134 N.W. 167, 167, 169
(Neb. 1912) (upholding a condition in a permit to appropriate water for hydroelectric
power generation prohibiting transmission of the power outside the state because that
would be detrimental to the public interest). Today, such a prohibition likely would be
invalid under modern Dormant Commerce Clause case law. See New England Power
Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982).
39. Hinderlider,110 P. 1045.
40. Id. at 1046.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1050.
Id.
Id. at 1050-51.
Id. at 1050.

46.

MEYERs, supra note 7, at 3-4.
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2. The Other-Laws Model
After the second decade of the twentieth century, reported litigation on public interest review of water permit applications virtually
ceased for more than half a century. The notable exceptions were two
cases during the 1940s concerning nondelegation challenges to permit
statutes that did not define the public interest.
In Clark v. Briscoe, a Texas Court of Civil Appeals said adequate
standards existed to guide the permitting agency because governing
"public policy is expressed in the related constitutional and statutory
enactments. What is delegated to the [Water] Board is to determine
from the factual situation presented in each particular case, whether
granting the permit would be 'detrimental to the public welfare,' as
declared in those enactments."47 By relying on the constitutional and
statutory policy provisions and making no mention of unwritten public
policy, the court seemed implicitly to embrace the other-laws model of
public interest review."
Clark contrasts with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Tanner
v. Bacon. 9 Under a legislatively reinstated requirement of public interest review in Utah, the state engineer preferred a large proposed appropriation for domestic, irrigation, and electric power generation
purposes over a previously filed but still pending application to appropriate less water solely to generate electric power. ' The larger, multipurpose project would provide greater benefits to more people. The
court said the smaller, single-purpose project was detrimental to the
public interest because it would not leave enough water supply for the
larger, multipurpose project,"1 in other words because of what economists would call its opportunity cost.
The Utah court rejected a nondelegation challenge on two
grounds. First, another state statute established water use preferences,
declaring that the use of water first for domestic purposes and next for
irrigation purposes should have preference over all other purposes."
The court said this statute provided an adequate standard to guide the
state engineer in choosing between the conflicting applications. 3 Second, the court stated: "That domestic use is the most beneficial use for
47. Clark v. Briscoe Irr. Co., 200 S.W.2d 674, 684 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
48. Constitutional and statutory provisions can guide an agency under the maximum-benefits model as well as under the other-laws model, but the court's reliance
solely on constitutional and statutory provisions seems to suggest acceptance of the
other-laws model.
49. 136 P.2d 957 (Utah 1943).
50. Id. at 959-60. The state legislature repealed the original public interest review
statute in 1905, and enacted the new one in 1911. Supra note 35 and accompanying
text; Tanner, 136 P.2d at 962.
51.
Tanner, 136 P.2d at 963.

52.
53.

Id.
Id.
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water and that irrigation is the next most beneficial use in the arid
western states is a self-evident and well recognized fact regardless of
any statute.""4
The court's second reason clearly was based on the maximumbenefits model of review, for it relied on unwritten public policy not
allowed under the other-laws model. The first reason, in contrast,
would be consistent with either model of review. Because the two
models conflict in their approaches-both as to the goal of review and
the use of unwritten public policy-it would do the court a disservice
to read its opinion as embracing both models of review. The opinion
is best read as based solely on the maximum-benefits model.
B. The Era of Accommodating Instream Flow Values
The prevailing development ethic in the West at the time of Hinderlider and for some decades afterwards has been summarized as follows:
"water was for 'working' not 'playing'; any drop of water that entered
the ocean unused was considered wasted; environmental, recreational,
and aesthetic benefits associated with flowing water were considered of
no real value, or at best, were to be sacrificed to human progress.""
That explains why early courts following the maximum-benefits model
(and apparently litigants as well) seemed to ignore the recreational,
aesthetic, and environmental costs of water diversions for consumptive
use. Eventually, however, public sentiment favoring a balance between
using water consumptively for economic development and maintaining
instream flows for their public values-that is, for their recreational,
aesthetic, water quality, and fish and wildlife habitat benefitsovertook the single-minded development ethic.'
The change in popular sentiment prompted many western legislatures to enact statutes that broadened the scope of public interest review to include instream flow values. A few legislatures did this by defining the public interest in their permit statutes for the first time, explicitly listing various instream flow values among the factors to be considered. A number of other legislatures left the public interest undefined in their permit statutes but enacted environmental policy or water management legislation that implicitly broadened public interest
review.
1. Statutes Listing Instream Flow Values as Public Interest Factors
Oregon was the first state to define the public interest in its water
permit statute. The legislature required that public interest review give
due regard for "[c]onserving the highest use of the water for all pur54.
55.
56.

Id.
Gould, supranote 26, at 98.
See NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 27, at 19,42,205.
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poses, including... public recreation, protection of commercial and
game fishing and wildlife ...

or any other beneficial use to which the

water may be applied for which it may have a special value to the public." 7 Oregon was ahead of the times, for it enacted this provision in
1929.5

Not until 1966 did another state define the public interest in its water permit statute. -" In that year, the new state of Alaska enacted a
permit statute requiring public interest review and listing eight factors
for the agency to consider.' In addition to several factors related to
economic development, the list included "the effect on fish and game
resources and on public recreational opportunities" and "the effect
upon access to navigable or public water.""
After Alaska, various other states followed its definitional approach
to one degree or another. North Dakota even copied the Alaska statute." Oregon amended its 1929 statute requiring consideration of
public recreation and commercial and game fishing by adding several
more factors, most notably "scenic attraction." 3 Kansas listed five public interest factors, one of which was whether the proposed water use
would prejudicially and unreasonably affect "[e]stablished minimum
desirable streamflow requirements."' Nebraska required public interest review of transfers and certain new appropriations consider not
only economic factors but also social and environmental factors.'
2. Statutes Implicitly Broadening Review to Include Instream Values
After Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) in 1969,' some states passed environmental policy acts patterned after the national model.67 Like NEPA, these acts require every
state agency to prepare an environmental impact statement for any

57.

Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 245, § 1, 1929 Or. Laws 252-53. (codified as amended

at OR. REv. STAT. § 537.170(8) (a) (2005)).
58. Id.
59.
60.

See Trelease, supra note 13, at 14, 24.
ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (2006).

61. Id.
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06(4) (2005) (omitting two of the eight Alaska factors-whether the proposed appropriation would affect public health and whether it
would affect access to navigable or public water).
63. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.170(8) (a) (2005).
64.

KAN. STAT. ANN.§82a-711(b) (2004).

65.

NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-235(2)-(4) (listing requirements for induced groundwater

recharge appropriations), 46-294(1) (listing requirements for transfers), 46-2,116 (list-

ing requirements for instream flow appropriations) (2005).
66. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335 (2000).
67. David Sive & Mark A. Chertok, Little "NEPA'S" and Their Environmental Impact
Assessment Procedures in Environmental Impact Assessment: NEPA and Related Requirements 325, 327 (American Law Institute 2004).
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action (or in some states, major action) by the agency that would significantly affect the quality of the environment.'
In 1971, Washington enacted both a NEPA-like environmental policy act' and a water resources act.70 The latter act sets out substantive
water policies7' and requires, among other things, protection of the
natural environment and potable water supplies to meet human
needs. 72 Neither act explicitly amended the water permit statute requiring public interest review of applications. 73 The Department of
Water Resources, the administrator of the permit statute, refused to
consider how a proposed appropriation would affect water quality during public interest review for two reasons. First, the statutory public
interest standard dated from 1917, and in historical context related
solely to the withdrawal of water from its source, not pollution. 4 Second, other agencies had legislative authority to regulate water pollution.75 In Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, however, the Washington Supreme Court held that each of the two 1971 acts implicitly
broadened public interest review to require the Department of Water
Resources to consider water pollution. 6
Stempel's reliance on the Washington environmental policy act
stands as an example for other states with NEPA-like environmental
policy acts. The same logic appears to be behind a Texas administrative regulation that says public interest review of applications to appropriate water or transfer existing water rights should "consider the social, economic and environmental impact statement submitted with an
application if required by [other provisions of the administrative code]
(relating to Environmental, Social and Economic Impacts Statements) .,,77

68. Id. at 333-37.
69. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21C.010-.914 (West 2006).
70. §§ 90.54.005-.920.
71. § 90.54.010(2).
72. § 90.54.020(3-5).
73. Stempel v. Dep't of Water Res., 508 P.2d 166, 170 (Wash. 1973).
74. Id. at 171.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 171-72. A federal precursor unmentioned by the court supports its reasoning. Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 requires a dredge and fill
permit from the Corps of Engineers for any activity or structure that will obstruct the
navigable capacity of waterways. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000). Historically, the Corps considered only the effects of a proposed activity or structure on navigation in reviewing
permit applications, but in Zabel v. Tabb the Corps denied a permit for a project with
no adverse navigation effects because it would harm fish and wildlife. Zabel v.Tabb,
430 F.2d 199, 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1970). The Fifth Circuit upheld the denial, reasoning
that the scope of review was implicitly broadened by NEPA and by the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act of 1934. Id. at 209-14.
77. 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 297.46 (2003) (citations omitted).
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3. The Two Models During This Era
Courts never had occasion to consider the two rival models of public interest review during the era of accommodating instream flow values. The widespread enactment of legislation explicitly or implicitly
including instream flow values in review tended to make litigation unnecessary, especially after Stempel. Even in Stempel, the Washington
court did not face a choice between the models. The state environmental policy and water management acts would support including
instream flow values in review under the other-laws model. The Stempel
court may have operated under this model. But the court also could
have reached that result under the maximum-benefits model by relying
on the new legislation for public policy guidance. The maximumbenefits model does not preclude reliance on statutory public policy to
guide the benefit-cost calculus; it just allows reliance on unwritten public policy as well.
Of course, in states where the legislature left the public interest
undefined and did not enact any modern legislation like that in Stempel, recourse to the maximum-benefits model would be necessary to
include instream flow values in review. But that situation did not come
to an appellate court during this era (nor has it yet).
C. The Present Era
Since the mid-1980s, efforts by water project opponents to broaden
the scope of public interest review in novel ways have generated appellate litigation in numbers not seen since the early years of public interest review. The discussion below focuses on the new factors that these
opponents sought to include in public interest review. It begins with
an administrative ruling not reviewed by an appellate court and then
turns to the judicial decisions.
1. Land Recreation
In considering applications to appropriate water for a hog farm,
the South Dakota Water Management Board said it was a significant
public interest concern that odors from the farm would sometimes
reach nearby public recreation areas (though the board ultimately decided the economic benefits of the hog farm outweighed the recreational costs).' The board did not refer to any air quality statute or
regulation. It must have been operating under the maximum-benefits
model guided by unwritten public policy.

78. In re Application of Water Permit No. 4580A-3, Finding of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Final Decision (Oct. 29, 1986).
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2. Flood Damage to Neighboring Property

The South Dakota and Utah Supreme Courts have ruled that
public interest review should include whether a proposed project
will flood and damage neighboring property.' Neither court
provided any explanation,' so it is uncertain which model of
public interest review the courts consciously or unconsciously
followed. As noted above, the South Dakota Water Management
Board used the maximum-benefits model in its hog odor ruling,8'
but that says nothing about what the South Dakota Supreme
Court did in the property damage case. The Utah Supreme Court
adhered to the maximum-benefits model in Tanner,8" so consistency
would suggest that it must have done the same in its property damage
case.
3. Cultural Values
In re Sleeper is a New Mexico trial court decision that held public interest review of applications to change the place and nature of use of
existing water rights should include how the transfer would affect the
local culture of rural Rio Arriba County in north central New Mexico."
The state engineer approved transfers totaling about 14 acre-feet annually from irrigation to convert a gravel pit into a recreational lake at
a resort and subdivision development in the county.14 On de novo review before the trial court, the applicants argued that the transfers
were in the public interest because the local community would benefit
economically from tourism.' But the trial court found that the resort
would create few jobs for existing residents except for menial ones
such as maids and waiters or as professional "natives" on the fringe of

79. Dekay v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 524 N.W.2d 855, 859 (S.D. 1994); Bonham
v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499, 502 (Utah 1989).
80. The main issue that occupied the court in Bonham was whether an ambiguous
statute on water right transfers required public interest review. Bonham, 788 P.2d at
500-02.
81. In re Application of Water Permit No. 4580A-3, Finding of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Final Decision (Oct. 29, 1986).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
83. Ensenada Land & Water Ass'n v. Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787, 788 (N.M. Ct. Apps.
1988) (modifying Sleeper v. Ensenada Land and Water Ass'n, No. RA 84-53(C) (N.M.
Dist. Ct. Apr. 16, 1985)); see Charles T. DuMars & Michele Minnis, New Mexico Water
Law: DeterminingPublic Welfare Values in Water Rights Allocation, 31 ARiz. L. REv. 817, 82426 (1989) (detailing the facts of Sleeper); see alsoJOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF

WATER RESOURCES 252-53 (3d ed. 2000); CHARLES J. MEYERS ET AL., WATER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT 434-35 (3d ed. 1988).
84. DuMars &Minnis, supra note 83, at 825.
85. Id. at 825-26.
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the tourist industry.' It also found that the transfers would be the first
step in destroying a local agrarian culture, not measurable in dollars,
in which existing residents took fierce pride. "7 The court concluded
that the proposed transfers of "water rights, devoted for more than a
century to agricultural purposes, in order to construct a playground for
those who can pay is a poor trade, indeed."88 It thus ruled that the
transfers were detrimental to the public interest.89
The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the
water code in force at the time authorized public interest review only
for new appropriations, not for transfers of existing appropriations to
new uses.' ° (The legislature later required public interest review for
transfers."1 ) Given the ground for reversal, the appellate court had no
need to address whether cultural values should be part of public interest review under a statute that does not define the public interest.
It remains unsettled whether an undefined public interest standard
authorizes consideration of cultural values in New Mexico. Like the
New Mexico Territorial Supreme Court in Hinderlider," the Sleeper trial
court operated under the maximum-benefits model and implemented
what it considered to be unwritten public policy. But the unwritten
public policies in the two cases were quite different. Hinderliderimplemented an unwritten appropriation doctrine policy of maximum
economic development. 3 Hinderlideris not necessarily precedent for
wholesale implementation of unwritten policies in public interest review. During the Hinderlider era, the policy of maximum economic
development was too well established to be doubted. 4 In contrast, an
unwritten policy of protecting cultural values is not so well established
as to its existence, force, or substantive contours.
For this reason, it is doubtful that courts should read the New Mexico statutes requiring public interest review of new appropriations and
transfers to include cultural values. Maybe the legislatures that enacted the statutes did not care about preserving cultural values. Maybe
they did care but wanted a different governmental entity, not the state
engineer's office, to be in charge of preserving cultural values.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 826; SAx, supra note 83, at 252.
SAx, supra note 83, at 252-53.
Id. at 253.
Id.

90. Ensenada Land & Water Co. v. Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787, 790-91 (N.M. Ct. App.
1988).
91. The legislature extended public interest review to transfers as part of an effort
to regulate the out-of-state export of water. N.M. STAT. §§ 72-12-7(A), 72-12B-1 (2005).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
93. Young& Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045,1050 (N.M. 1910).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 46 & 55. As the United States Supreme
Court observed recently in another context, "[p]romoting economic development is a
traditional and long accepted function of government." Kelo v. City of New London,
125 S.Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005).
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In fact, New Mexico land planning enabling legislation authorizes
county commissions to adopt subdivision regulations that provide,
among other things, for "harmonious development,"95 and this likely
includes authority to prevent development disharmonious with a
unique and prized culture. After the court reversed Sleeper on appeal,
the Rio Arriba County Commission adopted a subdivision ordinance
designed "to protect the unique culture" in the county by declaring
that the transfer of water from irrigation to subdivision or commercial
use "will generally not promote the public welfare."96
Of course, the question remains whether the state engineer's authority over water transfers preempts such county regulation. A case
from another state shows that preemption is not inevitable. Nevada
enabling legislation authorizes counties to adopt zoning and planning
ordinances to preserve water quality, to promote orderly physical
growth and development, and to promote health and the general welfare." In Serpa v. County of Washoe, the Nevada Supreme Court said that
the authorization vested counties with power to determine water availability and to protect the water supply. Furthermore, said the court,
the state engineer's issuance of a permit to appropriate groundwater
for a subdivision did not preclude the county from rejecting the subdivision under its land use plan for lack of an adequate groundwater
supply.'
The court found nothing in state law that preempted a
county from "enacting zoning laws that impose limitations on water use
that are more restrictive than those of the State Engineer.""
4. Anything That People Who Will Be Affected Care About
Idaho came late to public interest review of water permit applications, not requiring it until 1978. ' The statute requiring review used
the novel phrase "local public interest" and defined it as "the affairs of
the people in the area directly affected by the proposed use."' ° Although this definition limits the geographical scope of review, it does
95.

N.M.

STAT.

§ 3-19-6(A) (1) (2005) (delineating powers of municipalities); N.M.

STAT. § 4-37-1 (2005) (giving counties the same subdivision planning powers as municipalities).
96. SAX, supranote 83, at 253.
97. NEV.REV. STAT. §§ 278.230(1) (a), 278.250(2) (a), (k) (2004).
98. Serpa v. County of Washoe, 901 P.2d 690, 692 (Nev. 1995).
99. Id. at 692-93.
100. Id. at 693; see also Delta Wetlands Props. v. County of San Joaquin, 16 Cal. Rptr.
3d 672, 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding the state water board's authority to issue
permits to appropriate water "has not preempted the entire filed relating to the regulation of water projects" and leaving for the future precisely what conditions a county
may impose under its authority to regulate land use).
101. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-203A(5) (e) (2005). Later, the legislature imposed the
same requirement for water right transfers. Id. § 42-222(1).
102. Id. § 42-203A(5)(e).
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not say much more about which model of review to use than the traditional undefined phrase "public interest." One can still ask whether
the affected interests of local people should count only if they are recognized as legitimate by other laws (as would be the case under the
other-laws model of review), or whether all their affected interests
should count (as would be the case under the maximum-benefits
model, at least if those interests are recognized by written or unwritten
public policy).
a. BroadJudicial Interpretation
In 1985, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the scope of review in
Shokal v. Dunn.' The court began by noting that in addition to requiring public interest review of water permit applications, the 1978 legislature also passed a minimum streamflow act that declared it was in the
public interest "to preserve the minimum stream flows required for the
protection of fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic
beauty, transportation and navigation values, and water quality." °4 The
court said the legislature must have intended public interest review of
water permit applications to include the same factors it listed in the
minimum streamflow act.' 5
The court did not stop there. It identified several additional factors not mentioned in the minimum streamflow act that "common
sense argues ought to be considered part of the local public interest."'
The court added that it did not intend its list of factors to be comprehensive and gave the following explanation: "As observed long ago by
the New Mexico Supreme Court, the 'public interest' should be read
broadly in order to 'secure the greatest possible benefit from [the public waters] for the public."" 7 So ultimately, the Idaho court accepted
the maximum-benefits model of Hinderlider,with an updated view of
unwritten public policy.
b. Administrative and Legislative Reactions
The Idaho Department of Water Resources eagerly embraced ShokaL Over the next fifteen years or so, the department included the
following factors in public interest review:
compliance with air, water, and hazardous substance standards, compliance with planning and zoning ordinances of local or state government jurisdictions, economic benefits, economic detriments,
103.
104.
105.

707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985).
Id. at 448-49 (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN § 42-1501 (2005)).
Shokal, 707 P.2d at 449.

106.

Id.

107.

Id. (citation omitted).
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the management of obnoxious odors, the cumulative effect of odors,
impact on the property of the area (including property values), flies,
traffic, dust, past disregard by the applicant of the impact of a dairy
upon other properties and upon the people in the area, injury to
other water rights (including minimum instream flow rights), and the
economic effect of a departing municipal water user [that sought to
make its own water appropriation and cease paying water fees to the
municipality] .'
While some of these factors were grounded in written public policy,
others surely were based only in unwritten public policy.
As the agency's broadening of public interest review unfolded, significant opposition developed. Opponents complained about costly
delays in the permit process and about the need to hire experts to respond to a broad array of social, economic, and environmental issues."
They also argued that the Department of Water Resources lacks expertise concerning matters such as odors, flies, traffic, and dust. They said
these matters could be addressed better by other state agencies, such as
the departments of agriculture and environmental quality, or by local
land use agencies."'
The legislature agreed with the criticisms and in 2003 revised the
definition of the "local public interest," changing it from "the affairs of
the people in the area directly affected by the proposed use" to "the
interests that the people in the area directly affected by a proposed
water use have in the effects of such use on the public water resource.....
Read literally, the revised statute would exclude from public interest
review the economic benefits of using water for manufacturing or irrigation, and the public health benefits of using water for municipal
supply. Under this reading, few if any proposed water uses for manufacturing, irrigation, or municipal water supply would pass public interest review.
But the legislature did not intend that literal a reading. A Statement of Purpose that accompanied the bill through the legislature
states: "The 'local public interest' should be construed to ensure the
greatest possible benefit from the public waters is achieved; however, it
should not be construed to require the Department to consider secondary effects of an activity simply because that activity happens to use
water."... It gives the following example:
108. Robert L. Harris, Comment, Narrowing the Local Public Interest Criterion in Idaho
Water Right Transfers, 39 IDAHO L. REv. 713, 719 (2003).
109. Id. at 716. This complaint is noted in the legislative Statement of Purpose referred to in the text infra accompanying notes 112-113.

110.

Harris, supra note 108, at 731-35.

111. Act of April 7, 2003, ch. 298, 2003 Idaho Laws 806 (amending Idaho Code § 42202B(3) and 42-203A(5)(e)) (emphasis added).
112. IDAHO HOUSE BiLL No. 284, 57th Legislature, First Regular Session, available at
http://www3.state.id.us/oasis/2003/H0284.html.
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[T] he effect of a new manufacturing plant on water quality, resident
fish and wildlife and the availability of water for other beneficial uses
is appropriately considered under the local public interest criteria.
On the other hand, the effect of the manufacturing plant on the air
quality is not within the local public interest criteria because it is not
an effect of the diversion of water but rather a secondary effect of the
proposed plant. While the impact of the manufacturing plant on air
quality is important, this effect should be evaluated by [Department
of Environmental Quality] under the [Environmental Protection and
Health Act]." 3
The Statement of Purpose embraces the maximum-benefits goal,
and it says nothing about excluding secondary benefits even though it
excludes secondary costs from the Department's maximization calculus
on the ground of institutional competence. In effect, it tells the Department to maximize benefits to the community while wearing blinders as to secondary costs.
One wonders whether the Idaho legislature would have wanted to
exclude from review the secondary cost of flooding and damage to
neighboring property had it considered that issue. There is unlikely to
be another agency with greater competence to consider that than the
Department of Water Resources. Furthermore, the common law of
Idaho (and other western states) requires appropriators to use and
control water so as not to injure neighboring land."'4 If a proposed
appropriation or water right transfer would flood and damage
neighboring property, it would make sense for the Department of Water Resources to address that in the permit process to avoid the property damage and likely ensuing litigation by the neighboring landowner for monetary and injunctive relief.
Also, one can question the wisdom of dividing up responsibility for
evaluating the effects of a proposed water project among the Department of Water Resources and other state and local agencies, with no
agency taking an overall look at the costs and benefits. The first major
appellate case on NEPA, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. United
States Atomic Energy Commission, explained the problem with divided
agency responsibility:
[Specialized regulatory] agencies, without overall responsibility for
the particular federal action in question, attend only to one aspect of
the problem: the magnitude of certain environmental costs. They
simply determine whether those costs exceed an allowable amount...
[They] do not attempt to weigh that damage against the opposing
benefits. Thus the balancing analysis remains to be done. It may be
113.

Id.

114. Loosli v. Heseman, 162 P.2d 393, 397 (Idaho 1945); Peters v. Langrehr, 197
N.W.2d 698, 702 (Neb. 1972).
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that the environmental costs, though passing prescribed standards,
economic
are nonetheless great enough to outweigh the particular
5
and technical benefits involved in the planned action."

Similarly, a proposed water-using project might comply with all applicable water quality standards, air pollution standards, hazardous
waste standards, and local land use standards, but if an agency with
overall responsibility were to calculate the total costs and benefits of
the project, the costs might outweigh the benefits.
5. Economic Comparison of Water Supply Alternatives for
the Applicant
In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Washoe County, Washoe
County in northern Nevada sought to pump groundwater from the
Honey Lake Basin and export it to the growing metropolitan Reno
area located within Washoe County."6 The proposed wells were in Ne7
vada, though the Honey Lake Basin extends into California as well."
The Pyramid Lake Tribe and Lassen County, California argued that
the Honey Lake Project was detrimental to the public interest on economic and environmental grounds."' Their economic challenge was
that the Honey Lake project would be more costly than obtaining additional water for the metropolitan Reno area from the Truckee River in
settlement negotiations going on among Nevada, California, and various Indian tribes regarding the interstate Truckee-Carson-Pyramid
Lake River system."'
The Nevada state engineer refused to consider the economic challenge."5 Adhering to the other-laws model of public interest review
long used in Nevada, he compiled a list of thirteen policies in state
water appropriation statutes to guide his review of the Honey Lake applications.' 2 ' These statutory policies included, for example, requirements that an appropriation must be for a beneficial use, that an applicant for a large project must show the financial capability to develop it,
and that wells must not deplete groundwater below reasonable pumping levels set by the state engineer. 1" The court found that the thirteen

115. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
116. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Washoe County, 918 P.2d 697, 698 (Nev. 1996).
Also, two other entities in ajoint venture with Washoe County sought permits for transfers of existing water rights to the $eno area. Id.
117. Id. at 698 n.I.
118. Id. at 698.
119. Id. at 698-99.
120. Id. at 700.
121. Id. at 698-99.
122. Id.
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policy guidelines adequately defined the public interest. ' Although
the court did not say so explicitly, it unmistakably implied that public
interest review could not include any factors beyond those contained
in state water statutes. That is, the "other laws" in the other-laws model
2 4
of review are limited to state water statutes.
On the specific issue before it in Pyramid Lake, the court noted that
the state engineer had "no express authority to engage in a comparative economic analysis of water delivery alternatives." ' 5 It also noted
that the state legislature had expressly charged Washoe County elected
officials with developing a plan to meet regional water needs and
choosing among alternative methods of augmenting the water supply.' It said this charge necessarily entailed authority to compare the
economics and cost effectiveness of supply alternatives in order to determine which one was optimal.27 The court concluded that the legis-

lature intended the elected county officials, and not the state engineer,
should "conduct the political and economic decision-making required
to determine which water allocation alternative is appropriate."'"
Although the Nevada court clearly followed the other-laws model
of review, the court arguably could and should have reached the same
decision under the maximum-benefits model. While the maximumbenefits model of review has long included comparative economic
analysis, that analysis has compared the economic benefits of conflicting proposed projects sought by different applicants so the permitting
agency can choose the one that would provide greater economic benefits to the community."n The comparative economic analysis sought by
the Pyramid Lake Tribe and Lassen County was different. It concerned the cost-effectiveness of an applicant's proposed project compared to an alternative way for that applicantto get the additional water
it needs.
123. Id. at 700.
124. Notwithstanding Pyramid Lake, the state engineer later relied on a Nevada statute not in the water code-NEv. REV. STAT. § 459.910, which makes it unlawful for any
person or governmental entity to store high-level radioactive waste in Nevada-to deny

the United States a permit to appropriate water for use at Yucca Mountain to develop a
disposal site for such waste. The Nevada federal district court overturned the decision,
in significant part because § 459.910 is not a Nevada water law statute. See United
States v. Nevada, CV-S-00-268-RLH (LRL) 1-2, 8 (D. Nev. 2003) (Order on Motion for

Summary Judgment and Motion to Stay). Thereafter the state engineer again denied
the United States a permit on the ground that its proposed use did not meet the beneficial use requirement of the Nevada water code. In re Applications to Appropriate
Underground Waters in Fortymile Canyon- Jackass Flat Hydrographic Basin, Nev.
State Eng'r Office Ruling No. 5307, 13 (Nov. 7, 2003), available at

http://water.nv.gov/scans/rulings/5307r.pdf.
125.

Pyramid Lake, 918 P.2d.at 701.

126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id.

129.

See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
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When a permit applicant is a private entity, there is no need for the
state water agency to scrutinize whether the applicant could get
needed water more cheaply by a different means. If the private entity
thinks the more costly alternative will better serve its interests for whatever reason, e.g., because the water supply will be more dependable, its
choice would not be a matter of public concern. Of course, Washoe
County is a public entity, and public expenditures were involved in
The county officials
obtaining more water for the Reno area."
claimed that they preferred the Honey Lake project because, among
other things, that project would actually cost less than getting water
from the negotiated settlement."' Whatever the reason why county
officials preferred the Honey Lake project, the public economic consequences of their decision are arguably more appropriately a matter
between them and their taxpaying electors than between them and the
state engineer. In any event, it is doubtful that unwritten public policy
should obligate public entities to choose the least expensive of alternative courses of action. Such a policy could engender countless lawsuits
from taxpayers, none of whom are in the majority of the electorate and
each urging variations from the alternative that the public entity decided was best.
6. Cumulative Effects of an Applicant's Program
In United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service ("USFWS") filed eight applications with the Nevada State Engineer to transfer 2,855 acre-feet of water rights purchased from irrigators for use to maintain wetlands in the Stillwater
National Wildlife Refuge.'32 Congress directed USFWS to acquire water
rights from willing sellers sufficient to sustain 25,000 acres of wildlife
habitat in the refuge. The 2,855 acre-feet were the first installment of
approximately 75,000 acre-feet that USFWS estimated it would have to
purchase and transfer over twenty years to fulfill the congressional directive.'33 Churchill County and the City of Fallon unsuccessfully protested the eight applications before the state engineer as detrimental
to the public interest.M
On review before the Ninth Circuit, they argued that the state engineer improperly limited public interest review to the eight applications before him.'" They said he should have studied the cumulative
effects on the public interest of the entire federal water right purchase130.
131.
132.
2003).
133.
134.
135.

Pyramid Lake, 918 P.2d at 708 (Springer, J. dissenting).
Pyramid Lake, 918 P.2d at 703.
United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 341 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir.
Id.
Id. at 1179.
Id. at 1181.
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and-transfer program. In response, the Ninth Circuit first said Pyramid
Lake means that Nevada limits public interest36 review "to considerations
identified in Nevada's water policy statutes.'

That point did not dispose of the case, however, because Churchill
County and the City of Fallon relied on Nevada statutes requiring the
state engineer to do "necessary studies" and to do, or have done, any
hydrological, environmental, or other study that he determines "is
necessary" before acting on permit applications.' 37 The Ninth Circuit
upheld the state engineer's refusal to study the cumulative impacts of
the entire federal program. It said these statutes gave him discretion
to decide what studies were necessary, and it found his decision was
within the range of discretion."
Churchill County and the City of Fallon may have been inspired to
seek a programmatic assessment by analogizing to a NEPA rule that
requires a federal agency in some circumstances to prepare a programmatic environmental impact statement before it decides whether
to adopt a broad new program.' The analogy is inapt, however.' G The
state engineer did not have the entire 75,000 acre-feet federal program
before him for decision. He only had to decide whether to approve
the eight applications totaling 2,855 acre-feet that USFWS filed. Even
if transfer of the entire 75,000 acre-feet might create a public interest
problem, that would not be a reason for him to deny transfer of the
2,855 acre-feet if the smaller transfer would not be detrimental to the
public interest. The state engineer's containment of the scope of review avoided wasting time and money on studies that did not bear on
the decision he had pending.
Although the Ninth Circuit adhered to the other-laws model used
in Nevada, the outcome in Alpine Land might well have been the same
under the maximum-benefits model. Under the latter model, the state
engineer would have to decide whether approving the eight applications before him would maximize benefits to the community. He
would not have to decide at that time how later possible components
of the federal program would affect the maximization goal.
M. ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
The preceding examination of the history of public interest review
from the analytical perspective of the two models suggests the likely
importance of several issues in future cases.
136.

Id. at 1183.

137.
138.

Id.
Id. at 1184.

139. See40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(b) (2005).
140. Besides, Churchill County's challenge to the adequacy of the environmental
impact statement USFWS prepared under NEPA for its water aright acquisition program failed in Churchill County v. Norton, 276 F.3d 1060, 1082 (9th Cir. 2001).
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A. Choosing a Model of Review (Or Variation of a Model)
Some factors may be relevant to public interest review under both
models, and some may be irrelevant under both models. But the
choice of model will sometimes determine whether particular factors
are relevant because review serves different functions under the two
models. The maximum-benefits model seeks to maximize benefits to
the community. The other-laws model seeks to implement other statutory policies or constitutional policies. The two functions will converge
only in those few states with a statutory or constitutional provision calling for water allocation to maximize net benefits. 4 ' In most states, the
choice of model will result in different functions for public interest
review and, accordingly, will sometimes affect what factors are relevant
to review. In those states, the choice of model is an important issue for
the future.
A subsidiary issue is whether to use the classic form of the model
chosen or some variation of it. The classic maximum-benefits model
allows the use of unwritten public policy to guide the agency in determining what should count as a benefit or cost in the maximization calculus. Hinderliderrelied on an unwritten public policy that favored
economic development, a policy that at the time was widely accepted
and of undoubted high importance.' 2 The trial court in Sleeper relied
on an unwritten public policy regarding cultural values that may have
been far more speculative.' 3 Conceivably, however, an agency using
the maximum-benefits model might choose to be guided only by written public policy. The agency might decide to ignore unwritten public
policy on the ground that its existence, contours, and force are often
too unclear-or, in any event, on the ground that the legislature has
never explicitly embraced it.
Similarly, the classic form of the other-laws model limits relevant
"other laws" to state water statutes. Presumably, this should include
administrative regulations implementing the water statutes. If so, it
should also include elements of a state water plan developed under
statutory authorization.'" But under a variation of the classic form, an
agency might decide to include common law rules as well.
141. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 1-2 (2006) (establishing a policy of managing the
state's natural resources for the maximum benefit of its people); WASH. REv. CODE §
90.54.020(2) (West 2006) (directing that the state's waters generally shall be allocated
to secure "the maximum net benefits for the people of the state"); OR. REv. STAT. §
537.170(8) (2005) (making maximum economic development one of seven relevant
factors in contested permit cases).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 39-46.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 83-94.
144. Cf FrankJ. Trelease, Water Law, Policies, and Politics: Institutionsfor Decision Making in WESTERN WATER RESOURCES: COMING PROBLEMS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES 199,
203 (1980) ("A modern water planning process can be integrated with the permit procedure and provide policy guidelines for determining the public interest.").
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Of course, an agency must apply whichever model-or model variation-the legislature prefers if the legislature has indicated its choice.
A search for legislative choice is not necessarily fruitless everywhere.
The statutes on public interest review in a few states direct the permitting agency to consider alternative water uses that might be made
within a reasonable time but would be precluded by the applicant's
proposed use.'45 There would be little point in comparing the applicant's proposal with alternative water uses that the proposal would preclude unless the agency is supposed to choose the use that will produce
greater net benefits. Arguably, these statutes implicitly commit the
state to the maximum-benefits model.
However, in most states the statutes on public interest review provide no direction regarding the choice of model. In that situation,
what should an agency or reviewing court do? The agency or court
might ask what the legislature would have intended had the legislature
thought about the issue.'" But that would not accomplish much. Perhaps the legislature would have embraced the idea that water is a public resource and therefore should be allocated to maximize benefits to
the public. Instead, perhaps the legislature would have regarded itself
as limited by a strong nondelegation doctrine or would have been concerned about limiting administrative policy-making discretion, which
would have led it to prefer the other-laws model to implement an undefined public interest standard.'4 7
Absent statutory guidance on the choice of model, an agency that
has clearly and consistently adhered to one model might well continue
doing so on the theory that the legislature presumably is aware of the
practice and by silence agrees with it, and a reviewing court should
accept this agency practice." An agency that has not established a
clear position might regard either model as a reasonable choicehistorically both models have had their following-unless the state's
145.
ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080(b)(5) (2006); NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-2,116 (2004) (regarding instream flow appropriations); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06(4) (d) (2005).
146. Cf Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 49 (9th Cir. 1981)
(when "[tlhere is nothing to suggest Congress gave any consideration to [an issue]
we must determine what Congress would have intended had it considered it.")
147. Legislative concern about administrative subjectivity under the maximumbenefits model might be heightened with a newly enacted or reenacted public interest
statute if the function of review is to maximize combined economic and noneconomic
benefits, for that would require the permitting agency to weigh incommensurables.
148. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Washoe County, 918 P.2d 697, 700-01 (Nev.
1996) where the court refused to broaden public interest review beyond an other-laws

approach because
[t]he Nevada Legislature, presumably aware of the broad definition of the
public interest enacted by other states ... demonstrated through its silence

that Nevada's water law statutes should remain as they have been for over
forty-five years.... [T] he legislature-not this court-must signal a departure
from such a long-recognized Nevada water policy.
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nondelegation doctrine would prevent choosing the maximumbenefits model. A federal agency is free to choose any reasonable interpretation when a statute is silent about an issue, and a reviewing
court must accept the choice."9 That approach would be appropriate,
as well, regarding a state water permitting agency's choice of model of
review. While the approach would be appropriate, a better solution
would be for the state legislature to clarify which model or model variation it prefers.
B. Secondary Project Effects
The developments in Idaho since the mid-1980s highlight the issue
of whether public interest review should include consideration of the
secondary effects of a proposed appropriation or transfer, including
for example effects on air quality. Although Idaho follows the maximum-benefits model of review, this question can arise under both
models.
1. The Maximum-Benefits Model
The goal of maximizing benefits seems to imply the need to count
all of a project's benefits and deduct all of its costs. If some costs were
ignored, a project might gain a permit even though its total costs will
exceed its total benefits. Maximization-with-blinders is logically selfcontradictory.
The Idaho Legislature decided, however, to count all benefits and
deduct only direct costs. It excluded secondary costs on the ground of
relative institutional competence, that is, the Department of Water
Resources is less competent than other governmental agencies to address secondary costs. The logic of the maximization concept lost out
to a practical or political consideration."
In contrast, Washington appears to be fully committed to the logic
of maximization. Although it is unclear whether Washington uses the
149. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
Technically, Chevron dealt with agency rules, but later decisions apply the approach to
agency adjudications as well. SCHWARTZ, supranote 29 at § 10.35.
150. A somewhat similar triumph of the practical or political occurred at the federal
level regarding NEPA. The Calvert Cliffs'court refused to allow responsibility for con-

sidering the environmental effects of a federally licensed project to be divided among
specialized agencies, with no agency taking an overall look at those effects. Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The court also ruled that under NEPA, the Atomic En-

ergy Commission (AEC) could impose stricter water pollution controls on its licensees
than those required under the Clean Water Act. Id. at 1125. Congress responded to
Calvert Cliffs' by amending the Clean Water Act to say that nothing in NEPA shall be

deemed to authorize any federal agency to condition issuance of a license on any effluent limitation except those established under the Clean Water Act. Clean Water Act
§ 511(c) (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c) (2) (2000).
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maximum-benefits or other-laws model of review, its 1971 water resources act directs that the state's waters shall be allocated to secure
"the maximum net benefits for the people of the state" and instructs
that "[m]aximum net benefits shall constitute total benefits less costs
including opportunities lost.'. 1 Even if Washington uses the other-laws
model of review, this statute is an "other law" that the permitting
agency must apply in public interest review. If the word "total" in the
statute modifies costs as well as benefits, as it likely does, Washington
includes secondary costs in public interest review of water permit applications.
Idaho and Washington aside, state legislatures generally have not
addressed whether the maximization calculus should include or exclude secondary project effects. The vacuum leaves agencies and reviewing courts with an uncertain choice. The logical incoherence of
maximization-with-blinders cuts against excluding secondary costs.
Calvert Cliffs' reinforces that with its point about the wisdom of having
some agency consider the total picture of benefits and costs."' However, cutting the other way is the issue of institutional competence.
Perhaps also cutting the other way is the principle of decreasing marginal returns. The gathering and processing of data on secondary project effects as part of public interest review can be costly in time and
money, both to the permit applicant and to the permitting agency. If
other agencies are already regulating secondary water project costs, it
may be debatable how often water permitting agency consideration of
those costs will add enough to be worth the data gathering and processing burdens.'
2. The Other-Laws Model
In a state using the other-laws model of review, the issue of including secondary costs obviously will depend significantly on what constitutes "other laws." If the "other laws" model encompasses notjust state
water statutes but also other state statutes, such as those on air quality,
and common law rules, such as the rule that protects neighboring
property from flood damage, the model will include a wide range of
secondary costs.
But even if "other laws" are limited to state water statutes, this does
not mean that secondary costs will never be part of public interest review. Recently, the Nevada state engineer denied applications to appropriate groundwater for a new subdivision. He noted that existing

151. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.54.020(2) (West 2006).
152. Supra text accompanying note 115.
153. Issues of institutional competence and decreasing marginal utility may have
been behind the decision of Congress not to accept fully the Calvert Cliffs' reasoning in
the NEPA context. See supra note 150.
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county land use restrictions precluded building the subdivision, and he
reasoned that "the approval of water right permits to support a project
without viability would threaten to prove detrimental to the public interest."'' 4 Although the state engineer cited no "other law" imposing a
viability requirement, a state water statute requires a permit applicant
to prove that it has a "reasonable expectation actually to construct the
work and apply the water to the intended beneficial use with reasonable diligence."' Absent proof by the applicant in the subdivision case
that it could get the land use restrictions changed, it could not have a
reasonable expectation of applying the water to use serving the subdivision.'56
A "reasonable expectation" water statute like Nevada's, however,
will not always operate to make secondary costs relevant to review.
Suppose that a planned project would violate air quality standards but,
as commonly will be the case, the project could be modified to avoid
any violation. If the project were not modifiable, the state engineer
should consider the project's lack of viability under air quality standards, just as he considered the lack of viability under land use regulations in the subdivision case. But the viability rationale for considering
air quality disappears if the project could be modified to avoid violating the air quality standards.
If the project is modifiable to avoid violation, whether the water
permitting agency should consider air quality standards turns on
whether "other laws" should encompass more than state water statutes.
Whether "other laws" should include air quality standards involves a
policy judgment similar to that under the maximum-benefits model of
review. If a water permitting agency could avoid air pollution from a
proposed project by requiring modifications before issuing a permit,
that might be an efficient and effective way to enforce state policy on
air quality. This cuts in favor of a broad understanding of "other laws."
However, concerns about relative institutional competence and diminishing marginal returns cut against a broad understanding. A water
permitting agency or a reviewing court, in an other-laws state faces an
uncertain policy choice about how broadly to read "other laws" absent
legislative guidance.

154. In re Applications to Appropriate Waters Within the Bedell Flat Hydrographic
Basin, and Antelope Valley Hydrographic Basins, Ruling No. 5249, at 6 (Nev, State
Eng'r Office May 29, 2003), availableat http://water.nv.gov/scans/rulings/5249r.pdf.
155. NEV. REV.STAT. § 533.370(1) (c) (2) (2005).
156. In re Applications to Appropriate Waters Within the Bedell Flat Hydrographic
Basin, and the Antelope Hydrographic Basin, Ruling No. 5249, 6 (Nev, State Eng'r
Office May 29, 2003), available at http://water.nv.gov/scans/rulings/5249r.pdf.
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C. The "Community" Under the Maximum-Benefits Model
Under the maximum-benefits model of review, it is necessary to ascertain the community for which the reviewing agency or court should
maximize the benefits. This entails determining both the geographical
and temporal boundaries of the community.
1. Geographical Boundaries
The geographical boundary issue lurked in the background in
Sleeper. The New Mexico trial court's main interest was in the local
agrarian community and its fierce cultural pride. While the trial court
did not completely ignore the larger community of potential visitors to
the resort, it had little regard for their interest in what it disdainfully
called "a playground for those who can pay."'5 7 The larger geographical community almost did not count.
Most states lack statutory guidance on the geographical boundaries
of the community upon which public interest review should focus.
Those states with statutory guidance have disagreed about proper geographical boundaries. As noted earlier, the Idaho public interest review statute uses the phrase "local public interest" and defines it as the
interests of "the people in the area directly affected by the proposed
water use.'
In contrast, the Washington water resources act speaks of
maximizing benefits "for the people of the state."'" The disagreement
does not mean, however, that the geographical boundary issue is entirely up in the air in states without statutory guidance. Arguably, permitting agencies and reviewing courts should seek to maximize benefits for the people of the state since the agencies generally have statewide responsibilities.
Even if the geographical boundaries issue may be less unsettled
than other issues affecting the future of public interest review, legislative attention to it could still be worthwhile. If a legislature decides
that it prefers the use of local boundaries for the maximization calculus, it should change the statutory phrase "public interest" to read "local public interest" and define it as Idaho does. If a legislature prefers
the use of state boundaries, its enactment of language like that in
Washington might have some small psychological influence upon an
agency or reviewing court to take project effects outside the local area
more seriously than the Sleeper trial court seemingly did.

157.
158.
159.

SAx, supranote 83, at 253.
Supra text accompanying note 111.
Wash. Rev. Code § 90.54.020(2) (2206); see also supra text accompany note 151.
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2. Temporal Boundaries
The temporal boundary issue was prominent in Hinderlider. In that
early case, Hinderlider filed applications to appropriate water to irrigate about 14,000 acres, and the Young & Norton group sought a conflicting appropriation to irrigate about 5,000 acres located within the
14,000-acre tract." The cost of supplying water to the 14,000 acres
would have been at least $30 per acre, while the cost for the 5,000 acres
would have been only $11 per acre. ' The Young & Norton group consisted of settlers on the 5,000 acres, while the remaining 9,000 acres
apparently were unoccupied.'
The current settlers would have been better off if their smaller project got the permit, since they would pay only $11 per acre-foot for water rather than $30 or more. However, the court said the larger project
should get the permit if it would fit the available water supply and be
economically feasible at its higher cost per acre-foot. 63 Although the
larger project would be worse economically for the current settlers, it
would produce greater total economic benefits once settlers occupied
the additional 9,000 acres.' The court regarded the community for
which the engineer should maximize the benefits as consisting not just
of current settlers but also of future settlers.
A modern version of the temporal boundary issue concerns water
for urban growth. In maximizing the combined economic and noneconomic benefits from the water supply, should the agency's goal be to
maximize total benefits or average benefits? The former might call for
greater population growth than the latter.
To explain this, it is helpful to note similarity between the goal of
maximizing benefits to the community and the utilitarian principle of
maximizing the happiness of the community. PhilosopherJ.L. Mackie
has written that in implementing utilitarianism, it may be necessary
to compare alternative courses of action one of which would lead to
there being a large population each of whose members was only
moderately happy, and another of which would lead to there being a
smaller population each of whose members was very happy; in the
former there will be more total utility or happiness, in the latter a
160. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045, 1049 (N.M. 1910).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1050.
164. The larger project would maximize total economic production but not necessarily total net profits. For example, suppose the crop production per acre irrigated
would be $35. Total economic production of the 5,000-acre project would be
$175,000. Subtracting the cost of water at $11 per acre ($55,000), and ignoring other
production costs, would mean a net profit of $120,000. Total economic production of
the 14,000-acre project would be $490,000. Subtracting the cost of water at $30 per
acre ($420,000) would mean a net profit of only $70,000.
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higher average utility or happiness. For a fixed population, the
maxima of total utility and of average utility must coincide, but if the
size of the population is itself variable they can fall apart. Which of
the two,165then, is it whose maximization is to be the criterion of right
action?

Mackie found utilitarianism indeterminate on this question.'" So
did Richard A. Posner, who wrote, "nothing in utilitarianism establishes the boundaries of the community whose happiness is to be
maximized....
The same temporal boundary issue-and indeterminacy-can arise
with public interest review of water permit applications to provide water for urban growth. Nothing in an undefined public interest standard establishes the temporal boundaries of the community for which
benefits are to be maximized. In Hinderlider,the court fixed a temporal boundary that included future as well as current residents. The
court based its decision on widely accepted unwritten public policy of
that era favoring maximum economic development. In the modern
setting, claims of unwritten public policy regarding urban growth are
likely to be far more speculative than the earlier water ethic. Unless
there is a written policy of adequate specificity, decisions by water permitting agencies about temporal boundaries in specific cases can begin
to look like ad hoc actions by the administrative body.'" The decisions
would be more democratically acceptable if state legislatures were to
give more guidance on temporal boundaries than they generally have.
IV. CONCLUSION: TIME FOR LEGISLATIVE REVISITATION OF
PUBLIC INTEREST REVIEW
The early years of public interest review saw controversy and litigation. Next came a long period of calm. State engineers seldom denied
permits as detrimental to the public interest during the period of calm,
probably because conflicts between applications were rare and state
engineers deemed most new beneficial uses as being in the public interest." Since the mid-1980s, however, controversy and litigation have
returned. This situation is likely to continue as water project opponents test innovative ideas to broaden public interest review.
Several fundamental issues about the function and scope of review
that went unnoticed during the period of calm are likely to be promi165.

J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 127 (1977).
166. Id. at 126.
167. Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights, 110 YALE LJ. 527, 534 (2000) (book review).
168. Id. (stating that the indeterminacy of utilitarianism regarding community
boundaries make it "an unpalatable philosophy without a good deal of ad hoc jiggery").
169. See Frank J. Trelease, Alternatives to Appropriation Law, in WATER NEEDS FOR THE
FUTURE

59, 61-62 (Ved Nanda ed. 1977).
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nent as water project proponents and opponents continue to spar over
new ideas for broadening review. The issues are what model of review,
or model variation, the permitting agency should use; what secondary
water project effects the agency should in include in its review; and
under the maximum-benefits model, what geographical and temporal
boundaries should define the community for which the agency will
seek to maximize benefits. For the most part, existing statutes give no
guidance on how to resolve these issues. Just as state legislatures took
an active role not long ago in integrating instream flow values into
public interest review, they could and should now provide direction on
these fundamental issues. The issues involve policy judgments that are
more appropriate for legislative action than administrative or judicial
interpretation of vacuous existing statutes.

